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In Gillian Brock’s recent fine book Global Justice: a Cosmopolitan Account 
(Brock 2009), the relationship between cosmopolitanism and democra-
cy is articulated in two ways. First, through Brock’s own account of 
“Responsive Democracy”, and secondly through her application of 
Elizabeth Anderson’s theory of “democratic equality.” My reflections 
here are driven by a tension that appears to exist in Brock’s account. 
On the one hand there are the interests, outcomes and the effective-
ness of a politics that privileges the well being of the individual –the 
politics that is at the heart of a cosmopolitan account of global justice–. 
This leads Brock to privilege responsive or interest models of democ-
racy over participatory or moral/political agency models, which she 
argues are unsatisfactory at the task of providing for peoples’ justice 
interests. On the other hand, cosmopolitanism’s focus on the autono-
my of that same individual, and her freedom to pursue her own ends, 
and to do so in concert with her political confreres, would seem to re-
quire the participation of these individuals in the discourse which de-
termines what their interests are said to be, what their flourishing con-
sists in –in other words, requires the agency model which Brock puts 
aside. To put it slightly differently, the concern is that the democratic 
egalitarian autonomy which is generated by the individualism at the 
heart of liberal cosmopolitanism is not adequately accommodated by 
Brock’s Responsive Democracy.  
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 Brock directly deals with the question of global democracy in 
two chapters, one midway through the book, and one at the end. 
Chapter 4 is titled “Global Governance and the Nationalist Challenge: 
What does authentic democracy require”, and chapter 12 is titled 
“Equality, Cosmopolitanism, and Global Justice”. Brock commences 
the first of these two chapters thus: «So far I have argued that global 
justice requires that all are adequately positioned to enjoy prospects for 
a decent life, which requires we attend especially to enabling need satis-
faction, protecting basic freedom, and ensuring fair terms of coopera-
tion in collective endeavours» (84). In this chapter Brock is concerned 
to consider global governance arrangements which will satisfy these 
goals, and she is particularly concerned to satisfy the worries of those 
who think that such a cosmopolitan agenda would «undermine goods 
of importance to the nation, notably authentic democracy or national 
self-determination» (84). 
 What is “authentic democracy” –or as it is sometimes parsed, 
“genuine democracy”? In this chapter the argument about democracy 
is closely linked with arguments about national self determination and 
national identity. I am less concerned with these per se, than with 
where Brock’s discussion of them leads her with respect to the nature 
of authentic democracy. Brock’s way into the discussion is to moderate 
a debate between David Held and Will Kymlicka, juxtaposing Held’s 
cosmopolitan democracy project against Kymlicka’s democratic natio-
nalism –both well known positions, which need little rehearsal here 
(see especially Held 1995, Held 2004 and Kymlicka 2001). In Brock’s 
analysis, the issues at stake concern the preconditions necessary for the 
functioning of democratic mechanisms of governance at the interna-
tional level. Kymlicka argues that common national identity generates 
trust and solidarity, that this is required for authentic deliberation, in 
turn required for authentic democracy; and since nothing can take the 
place of this internationally, democracy will not be achievable. Held 
articulates «at least seven clusters of rights» which guarantee political par-
ticipation in communities, and focuses on mechanisms to gather the 
views of those being affected by decisions. Brock concludes that on 
Kymlicka’s own reasoning we should be able to develop –and extend-
ing her argument, perhaps already have developed– a global thin iden-
tity that is sufficient for us to see our choices as bound up with the 
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survival of our global society and its institutions into the indefinite fu-
ture (to echo Kymlicka’s words (98)). 
 What emerges out of this rehearsal of the Kymlicka/Held de-
bate is the primacy of the need for “meaningful democratic life”; on 
Brock’s analysis it may be possible to harmonize both views, at least in 
part by arguing for a picture where “language demarcated political 
communities are the primary forums for genuine participatory democra-
cy”, forums which are complemented by –or, more strongly, are un-
dergirded by– democratized international institutions (103).  
 The next subheading in this chapter asks a key question, and it is 
one that points to a tension at the heart of this book which I suggest is 
never fully explored, nor resolved. «Taking stock: what do we want 
from our global governance arrangements anyhow? Does it matter 
whether they are democratic?» (104). Does it matter whether they are demo-
cratic? Following Daniel Weinstock, Brock argues that there are two 
conceptions of democracy, and that which one we opt for is crucial in 
knowing how to answer the “does it matter?” question: «On the 
first…model, global democracy is desirable because it would enhance 
political agency…. On the second account, realizing more democracy 
globally would be desirable because it would enhance the realization of 
people’s interests». Brock favours the second of these accounts, and 
thus the answer to the «does it matter?» question is that yes, it matters, 
because democratic institutions «enhance the realization of people’s 
interests» –not because they guarantee people political agency.  
 Brock –as we shall see in more detail shortly– develops an account 
of democracy which she calls the “responsive Democracy” account, 
which she argues is best suited to conceptualizing democracy at the 
international level. It is an account which is considered appropriately 
democratic because it serves the interests of the people. The difficultly 
with her account is that it is not at all clear that “the people” would 
always agree with her about this. The people are –at one remove and 
then at another– gently sundered from their traditional role within 
democratic theory as active agents claiming the freedom to determine 
their political future, and are re-designated as the owners of sets of in-
terests which are articulated for them, and which governance mechan-
isms are created to satisfy. This, at any rate, strikes me as being the 
danger at the heart of Brock’s Responsive Democracy. At the theoreti-
cal level, too, it is difficult to square the individualism of Brock’s cos-
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mopolitanism (with all its agency and autonomy implications) with 
what looks surprisingly like an explicitly paternalistic theory of global 
governance. Let us look at some of the finer details. 
 Brock argues that there are two main desirable variables –some-
times in tension– for evaluating global governance arrangements: effec-
tiveness and accountability. Accountability, Brock argues, drawing on 
Robert Keohane and Ruth Grant (Grant & Keohane 2005), «implies 
that some actors have the right to hold other actors to a set of stan-
dards, to judge whether they have fulfilled their responsibilities in light 
of those standards, and to impose sanctions if they determine that 
these responsibilities have not been met» (104-5). Here again, there are 
two models: participation and delegation. Brock is of the view that «so 
far, perhaps rather too much emphasis has been placed on the role of 
participation in legitimating governance» (105). Brock combine’s Keo-
hane and Grant’s delegation model of accountability with Daniel 
Weinstock’s interest model of democracy (Weinstock 2006) to make 
what she calls her Responsive Democracy account. Brock says that it is 
possible to construct global governance and accountability mechanisms 
that are adequately democratic, when evaluated according to Respon-
sive Democracy. But there is a genuine question here as to whether 
Responsive Democracy is itself adequately democratic. 
 Perhaps the clearest way to express the danger I am concerned 
about is that Responsive Democracy sets out to respond to the inter-
ests of the people, not to the will of the people –the latter being tradi-
tional understanding of democracy. Both of these ideas have very long 
histories, and many caveats are needed here! It has long been unders-
tood that the will of the people can be perverse and ultimately un-
democratic; that mature democracies have complex and varied me-
chanisms for articulating what the will of the people might be. These 
are extraordinarily more complex than the populist idea that democra-
cy is like showing a majority of hands in a town hall meeting. Indeed, 
in her endorsement of Weinstock’s interest account of democracy, 
Brock accepts his analysis of many of the shortcomings of the agency 
account of democracy, where participation in collective decision mak-
ing is the sine qua non. The shortcomings Weinstock identifies are very 
real (such as collective action problems), and Weinstock is similarly 
correct to argue that in actually existing mature democracies there are a 
wide range of institutions which «complement democratic institutions’ 
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ability to realize citizens’ interests, but…are not themselves democra-
tic» –adding, «many of them are overtly paternalistic in their rationale 
and their operation». This is undoubtedly true. For my purposes the 
crucial thing to note here is that these institutions complement participato-
ry democratic institutions –such as electoral systems. They do not replace 
them; and at the end of the day, they are held accountable to them. 
 The danger, it seems to me, with Brock’s Responsive Democracy –
particularly given that it is intended to operate at the global level– is 
that by being articulated primarily in terms of interests, justice, results, 
delegation, and mandates of protection, the only real sense in which it 
is democratic is in its concern for the well being of all people (rather 
than, say, for the well being of the aristocratic classes or the interests of 
the capitalist class or the working class). This seems a long way from 
democracy understood as a form of self-determination where the terms 
of self rule are made by participants – citizens. (For debate over this 
point see in particular Lafont 2010 (and also other articles in the same 
journal issue) in response to Bohman 2007) 
 The big gap in this approach is the question of, shall we say, 
«who’s justice? Which interests?». While it is true that many of us 
would agree with Brock’s account of human needs and human flou-
rishing in broad terms, the problem is that when it comes to global 
governance, there will always be great dispute about what the best way 
to approximate the meeting of those needs and interests will be. And it 
is at this point, I think, where it is crucial for the well being of demo-
cracies that people be participatorially engaged in the determining of 
their own political destiny. It is altogether too easy to envisage Respon-
sive Democracy degenerating into yet another “peoples democracy” 
where the only vaguely democratic characteristic is the (usually vain) 
reference to “the people”, who are not consulted and who’s own ideas 
of their interest and welfare are disregarded. 
 Brock is alert to the dangers of delegated responsibility, particu-
larly with respect to the abuse of power. Her argument –drawing on 
Andrew Kuper’s similar account of responsive democracy (Kuper 
2006)– is that this can be managed by ensuring appropriate institution-
al design –maintaining the separation of powers, and designing other 
«adequate mechanisms of institutional and role accountability» (108). 
 This is all crucial; but it seems to me that it is not the main issue. 
The abuse of power within the functioning of governance institutions 
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is a real issue and must be addressed; but the real abuse of power that 
lies at the heart of democracy is when there is a large gap between 
people’s perception of their interests, well being and needs, and the 
account of these which is given by the political system. Arguably part 
of the crisis in many of our existing mature democracies is that people 
feel disenfranchised from the democratic system; they feel that “the 
people” in whose name it operates is not them. And they see no way to 
become effectively involved in changing this situation. And this leads 
us back to the question of participation. The real danger in Responsive 
Democracy is not the abuse of power, articulated as the managerial 
concern about corruption within the system. Rather, it is that the 
people are disenfranchised from a politics and a governance which re-
sponds to them but with which they have no meaningful connection –
rather than being a politics and a governance in which they can partici-
pate. 
 This possibility is one that strikes at the heart of the concern 
with equality which is usually taken to be a defining feature of cosmo-
politanism. Brock’s second chapter on democracy (chapter 12) engages 
with the question of equality directly, and to this we now turn. 
 
*** 
 
Brock rightly comments that all forms of Cosmopolitanism include a 
commitment to equality, but that exactly how this is understood varies 
widely. For her account of global justice, she draws on the “democratic 
equality” theory developed by Elizabeth Anderson (Anderson 1999). 
According to Anderson, theorists of egalitarianism should be trying «to 
create a community in which people stand in relations of equality to 
others» (301). As Brock articulates Anderson’s position, «Real egalita-
rians focus on abolishing oppression and trying to bring about the kind 
of social order that recognizes each person’s equality –namely, a demo-
cratic community» (302). Brock then goes on to quote Anderson on 
the nature of democracy. This is a key quotation for my purposes, be-
cause it clearly points to the issues I have been discussing above. 
Moreover, Brock’s endorsement of Anderson’s account has the effect 
of heightening the tension I have been discussing between interest and 
agent models of democracy; as we shall see, Anderson stresses the 
need for participation, whereas Brock argued that this has been over-
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emphasized. Interestingly, the tension here between Brock’s and An-
derson’s position is elided in Brock’s use of Anderson’s democratic 
equality theory. Here, then, is the key quotation: 
 
Democracy is here understood as collective self-determination 
by means of open discussion among equals, in accordance with 
rules acceptable to all. To stand as an equal before others in dis-
cussion means that one is entitled to participate, that others rec-
ognize an obligation to listen respectfully and respond to one’s 
arguments, that no one need bow and scrape before others or 
represent themselves as inferior to others as a condition of hav-
ing their claim heard (302; Anderson 1999, 313). 
 
 Participation in democratic self government as an equal member 
of society is central to Anderson’s account. I think Brock would want 
to say that it is also central to her account, and yet I am not sure that 
there is a clear sameness of meaning between what the two theorists 
intend. 
 Anderson’s emphasis on the entitlement to participate that each 
individual should have sits somewhat awkwardly with Brock’s focus on 
delegation and interests. Anderson’s claim that others must «recognise 
an obligation to listen respectfully and respond to one’s arguments» 
very much suggests the classical agency model of democracy away 
from which Brock seems keen to move. 
 On the classical account of democracy it is the making and en-
gaging with arguments of self determining individuals about what their 
interests might be thought to be which is the central business of dem-
ocratic politics. In the model that Brock presents, these interests are all 
substantially known already (or so it would seem) and all that is left to 
democracy is the provision of these interests, capabilities and function-
ings in harmonious and hopefully parsimonious ways. This, perhaps, is 
why (as noted above) the biggest danger in Brock’s account of dele-
gated authority is the abuse of power –rather than the use of power for 
the wrong ends, ends which self-governing individuals need to be able 
to discuss in a participatory forum in order to determine. 
 Brock’s endorsement of Anderson’s account, indeed her clear 
enthusiasm with respect to it, leads her to understate the conflict be-
tween the two accounts. Let us consider the section where Brock 
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shows the various ways in which Anderson’s account can be applied to 
global justice. Brock commences the section by saying that her account 
is «certainly consistent with the central demands of democratic equali-
ty» (304). But the first substantive example she uses in fact shows up the 
inconsistencies. Anderson’s principle is rehearsed («collective self-
determination by means of open discussion among equals»). Anderson 
here requires actual institutions and mechanisms. These can be argued 
to exist in certain modern democracies, but they do not at the global 
level, and will not in the foreseeable future. Brock acknowledges this 
absence, and uses it as the cue for a further elaboration of her earlier 
normative thought experiments which model the conditions required 
for inclusive conversation (discussed elsewhere in the book). These 
lead to the promotion of dialog about the nature of the egalitarian 
guarantees which are needed for justice in modern economies.  
 This is very important work, but the one thing it singularly is 
not, is «collective self-determination by means of open discussion 
among equals» in political institutions which have binding force. What 
we may well end up with is a set of highly developed, conscientiously 
modeled and researched egalitarian principles and procedures which 
can be adopted by such institutions of global governance as do exist. 
And, of course, on Brock’s model of Responsive Democracy, the de-
velopment and institutionalisation of these principles and procedures –
the construction of bodies and institutions which provide for capacities 
and functionings– all of these can be seen as evidence of the spread of 
Responsive Democracy, as Brock defined and articulated it. But pre-
cisely because, as Brock herself accepts, there is no mechanism for 
global collective self determination, it would seem that this responsive 
democracy is not really the same thing as the democracy articulated in 
Anderson’s Democratic Equality Model. And the fundamental reasons 
why are these: that not everyone has equal political agency, the rules 
are not acceptable to all, not everyone is entitled to participate, and 
others will not listen respectfully and respond accordingly (Anderson’s 
desiderata). 
 Brock directly relates Anderson’s democratic equality back to 
her earlier discussion of responsive democracy, and argues that the two 
work together because both seek to promote our standing in relations 
of equality one towards another –as indeed they do. The difference 
between them however, it seems to me, is that for Anderson this hap-
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pens within a “democratic community”, by which is meant a commu-
nity which is articulated through democratic institutions to which all 
have equal access. In the global environment, this is not the case –and 
is unlikely to be for a long time, and so the best one can hope for is 
something like Brock’s Responsive Democracy, where “the good 
people” (i.e., liberal cosmopolitans) manage to gain influence in global 
institutions which do paternalistically look out for the interests of the 
people under their jurisdiction. There is no doubt that a great deal of 
good will emerge out of such an arrangement. But what is missing is 
the voice and (more crucially) the agency of the people –the real people, 
the ones who’s lives and destinies are being altered by the decision 
makers in these institutions. 
 It is one of the great ironies of some liberal cosmopolitan 
thought that the philosophical commitment to egalitarianism can very 
easily lead to the acceptance of an inegalitarian paternalism. The cure 
for this problem in the case of the work at hand is for Anderson’s 
democratic equality to be more rigorously worked into the fabric of 
Brock’s responsive democracy. Brock cannot be faulted (she will be 
pleased to know!) for the unlikelihood of mechanisms of global demo-
cratic self determination (particularly, for example, within the UN sys-
tem). And there is no doubt that her excellent examples of institutions 
which can be constructed which will aid in the task of elevating people 
into relations of equality with one another should be pursued. Many of 
these (like similar suggestions by Thomas Pogge (see Pogge 2008, 
Pogge 2009) and Darrel Moellendorf (Moellendorf 2009)) are well 
worth pursuing, and encouraging enthusiasm for them among students 
of global politics is an important task of the first order. (One notes in 
passing a recent success on this score, the creation in Asia for the first 
time of a regional human rights authority. There are many reasons to 
be cautious about this institution, but there is no doubt that it raises 
the profile of human rights and by doing this alone aids in the political 
task of aiding relations of democratic equality (see Langlois 2011)). 
 The difficulty that I find with Brock’s excellent and engaging 
book is her case that Responsive Democracy can legitimately downplay 
the role of agency based arguments for democratic equality. I acknow-
ledge the limitations which she sees in the agency account. I don’t ac-
cept though that the interest account by itself trumps the agency ac-
count. I think it is clear from Anderson’s democratic equality theory 
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that political agency is the defining tenant of any meaningful account of 
democracy (where the terms of self rule are made by those so ruled). In 
its current form, Brock’s Responsive Democracy will be a significant 
aid to the establishing of relations of equality between human persons. 
But as I have argued elsewhere (Langlois 2003), those relations of 
equality remain desirable norms or standards only, rather than genuine-
ly democratic relations of equality, for as long as they exclude the prin-
ciple of political agency. 
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